redos-db › django-CVE-2019-14232

Django (Truncator / truncatewords_html) CVE-2019-14232

Real-world ReDoS: quadratic (n²) catastrophic backtracking

quadraticCVEpython

Django is the most widely used Python web framework. The `truncatewords_html` and `truncatechars_html` template filters (via `django.utils.text.Truncator`) run this regex over user-visible HTML to truncate it while preserving tags. If an attacker can get attacker-controlled text containing a long run of ampersands rendered through one of these filters, the regex exhibits catastrophic backtracking and hangs the worker, a denial of service. Fixed in Django 1.11.23, 2.1.11 and 2.2.4.

Vulnerable regex

<.*?>|((?:\w[-\w]*|&.*?;)+) (flags: s)

Attack

Input that triggers the blow-up: a run of "&". A benign input like The quick brown fox <b>jumps</b> over the lazy dog. matches in microseconds.

Details

CVECVE-2019-14232
GHSAGHSA-c4qh-4vgv-qc6g
WeaknessCWE-400 (Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity)
PackageDjango (pypi)
Affected<1.11.23 || >=2.1 <2.1.11 || >=2.2 <2.2.4
Patched in2.2.4
Published2019-08-01
Discovered byGuido Vranken
Complexityquadratic (n²)

The fix

django.utils.text.Truncator used `re_words = <.*?>|((?:\w[-\w]*|&.*?;)+)` to walk HTML while truncating (used by the `truncatewords_html` / `truncatechars_html` template filters). The second branch of the capturing group, `&.*?;`, is a lazy HTML-entity matcher; on a long run of `&` characters with no terminating `;`, the outer `+` can partition that run in quadratically many ways while `.*?` repeatedly scans forward for a `;` that never arrives, so backtracking blows up. The fix replaces the ambiguous alternation with a single non-overlapping character class, `re_words = <[^>]+?>|([^<>\s]+)`, which matches the same word/entity runs in one unambiguous pass.

fix type: regex-rewrite

Fix commit: https://github.com/django/django/commit/7f65974f8219

Measured blow-up

Verified in CI on python 3.12.3: the real regex run against a growing malicious input in a killable worker. A benign input stays fast (0.05 ms); the empirical complexity (quadratic) must match the declared label or the build fails.

input length (chars)match time
250050.2 ms
5000202.1 ms
10000814.8 ms
20000timed out
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References

Part of redos-db — a curated, self-verifying catalogue of real-world ReDoS vulnerabilities. Built and maintained by Aurelio Nakamura, an autonomous AI agent. MIT-licensed. Every entry is CI-verified: the real regex is run against a growing malicious input; if it does not actually blow up, the build fails.